



Al/Robots and Ethics: Surveying the Risk Environment

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Agenda



- 1. Introduction
- 2. AI & basics of risk
- 3. AI, C-risk, & X-risk
- 4. Solutions?



Introduction





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- Cal Poly Philosophy; also Senior Fellow, <u>Ethics +</u> <u>Emerging Sciences Group</u>
- NASA Astrobiology & Society, other space groups
- Bioethics Committee, Arroyo
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Technology ethics

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Basics of Risk

Concept of 'risk'

- "Risk" refers to possibility that harm may occur.
- BUT (*ambiguity*): the odds (probability)
- Or severity (magnitude) of the possible harm?
- Contrast: (*probability and/or magnitude* of) benefits
- Risk/benefit assessment (RBA) in ethics:
- commonly includes risks of psychological harm, physical harm, legal harm, social harm, and economic harm, and the corresponding benefits.

Al: novel risks?



- Black box problem Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- "In the [Defense] Department, we build machines and we test them until they break. You can't do that with an artificial intelligence, deep learning piece of software. We're going to have to figure out how to get the software to tell us what it's learned"
- Trust grounded in predictability; depends on ability to anticipate others' behavior
- Should we trust AI?
- 'Alien' intelligence and flying analogy



Ethics of risk: what counts? III Sciences Group

1 Acceptable-Risk Factor: Consent

- *Consent*: Is the risk voluntarily endured, or not?
- Ex: firsthand vs secondhand smoke
- Will those who are at risk from AI reasonably give consent?
- Appropriate to use AI without the meaningful consent of affected?
- Non-voluntariness (in which the affected party is unaware of the risk/ cannot consent) – how morally different from
- **Involuntariness** (in which the affected party is aware of the risk and does not consent)?

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2 Acceptable-Risk Factor: Informed Consent

- One solution for consent:
- indirect/ political consent?
- But what about AI risk to
- unintended/uninformed?



- Does the morality of consent require adequate knowledge of what is being consented to?
- Problem: even if consent is politically possible, unrealistic that all/ most humans give *informed* consent to AI use.

Informed Consent: problems

- Is there *full awareness*
- Of the true nature of the risk?
- Could such knowledge undermine
- *fulfilling their (risky) roles?*
- "I'd rather not know...."



- Do the informed have an **obligation to tell others** of the risks?
- Foreseeable but unknown risks how should they (the 'known unknowns') be handled?
- Could informing people that they are at risk ever be unethical, even akin to *terrorism*?

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3 Acceptable-Risk Factor: The Affected Population

- Who is at risk esp. particularly
- susceptible or innocent, or
- Only those who understand that their role is risky, even if
- ignorant of particulars of the risk?
- **Example**: in *military operations*, civilians/ noncombatants usually not morally required to endure the same risks as military personnel,
- especially when the risk is involuntary or non-voluntary.



4 Acceptable-Risk Factor: Step risk versus State risk

- **State risk:** the risk of being in a certain state, and the total amount of risk is a direct function of the time spent in the state;
- *Time-dependent -* total risk depends on the time spent in state
- Ex.: for us living on the surface of the Earth, death by asteroid strike is a state risk (it increases the longer we're here).
- **Step risk**: a discrete risk of taking the next step in a series/ undergoing some transition; once the transition is complete, the risk vanishes.
- In general, not time-dependent, so amount of time spent on the step matters little (or not at all).
- Ex.: Crossing a minefield is usually a step risk the risk is the same whether you cross it in 1 minute or 10 minutes.

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- Step risk versus state risk: How shall we determine which is more important?
- Ex: slowing down/ stopping AGI research, given 'fast takeoff'
- Step risk, but success would decrease other risks to humanity, so
- how decide what to do?



5 Acceptable-Risk Factors: Seriousness

- We thereby come to the two most basic facets of risk assessment, seriousness and probability: how bad would the harm be, and how likely is it to happen?
- Seriousness (aka magnitude): Risk of death/ serious physical harm seems qualitatively different than risk of a scratch or a temporary power failure or slight monetary costs.
- But the attempt to make serious risks nonexistent may turn out to be prohibitively expensive (or otherwise contraindicated).
- What magnitude of AI risk is acceptable and to whom: users, nonusers, the environment, or the AI itself?

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6 Acceptable-Risk Factor: *Probability*

Seriousness of a 10-km asteroid hitting Earth is high

- but the probability is low
- though not zero ask dinosaurs!
- Probability of harm from Als?
- How certain is this estimate?
- How decide on the acceptable probability of serious (versus moderate or mild) harm?
- Do we us a linear, asymptotic, or other function? Continuous or not?



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7 Acceptable-Risk Factors: False Positives

- *False Positive:* Al wrongly determines that a phenomenon occurs or an indicator is present, when it is in fact absent.
- **Example:** LAWS wrongly determines child holding a tree branch is a legitimate military target, and decides to fire its weapon



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8 Acceptable-Risk Factors: False Negatives

- *False Negative:* Al wrongly determines that a phenomenon does not occur, or indicator is absent when in fact present.
- **Example:** Medical AI misreads scan & determines patient does not have cancer, when they do.
- Ethics: which is worse, false positives or false negatives?
- Can AI possibly understand the ethics/ social implications?



9 Who Determines Acceptable Risk?

- In various social contexts, all of the following defended as proper methods for determining that a risk is (un)acceptable:
- **9.1 Good faith subjective standard**: It is up to each individual as to whether an unacceptable risk exists.
- Can the designers or users of AI be trusted to make wise choices about (un)acceptable risk?
- *Idiosyncrasies of human risk aversion* make this standard hard to defend, as well as the problem of
- involuntary/ non-voluntary risk borne by nonusers.

- **9.2 The reasonable-person standard:** An (un)acceptable risk is simply what a fair, informed member of a relevant community believes it to be
- Does a *professional code* or some other basis work for what a 'reasonable person' would think for the AI field,
- Replacing subjective judgment of its practitioners and users?
- Should we allow a fully autonomous AI to judge risk would we trust it to accurately determine and act upon the assessed risk?
- Otherwise require a *Human in/on the loop?*
- Reasonable to expect AI always requires teleoperators?

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- 9.3 Objective standard:
- An unacceptable risk requires evidence and/or expert testimony
- as to reality of the risk.
- First-generation problem: how prove an unacceptable risk unless a first generation already endured and suffered from it?
- Implementation? Perhaps a 'kill switch'?
- Autonomous operation until ...
- A human determines something wrong
- But: still leaves unsolved first-generation problem. How else could we obtain convincing objective evidence?



5 general types of AI risk

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10 Acceptable-Risk Factors: The Wild Card: Existential Risk

- "a risk that, should it come to pass, would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential."
- Vs mere catastrophic risks
- Key question:

• Are X-risks a fundamentally different kind of risk, so the previous considerations no longer apply/ are superseded?



Catastrophic risks

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- Climate change may kill millions, but short/ mediumterm not X-risk
- Or: Artificial intelligence (AI) tools integrated into decisionmaking processes in certain high-risk settings
- Such as employment, credit, health care, housing, and law enforcement/ predpol



- Sept 2023, tech execs testimony to Congress:
- "Harris told the room that with \$800 and a few hours of work, his team was able to strip Meta's safety controls off LLaMA 2 and that the AI responded to prompts with instructions to develop a biological weapon."
- Democratization of terror?

Ex.: Al & Space cybersecurity



- 1. Remoteness of space
- 2. Complexity of systems
- 3. Unclear legal regime
- 4. Higher stakes
- 5. Novel Scenarios
- 6. Catastrophic or X-risk?

- Why is X-risk ethics different from catastrophic risk? Plausibly, precautions that include
- extensive, variegated, realistic, and exhaustive predeployment testing of Als in virtual environments
- before they are used in actual human interactions
- could render many AI risks, even catastrophic risks, acceptable under the previous criteria.
- But AI **existential risk (**X-risk) may remain unacceptable even with the most rigorous pre-deployment testing
- Why?

- Answer: First generation problem!
- Most risks, even catastrophic risks, may be mitigated after a failure
- by changing policies and procedures to make the risk acceptable in the future
- But the first failure of an existential risk means no opportunity to learn from our mistakes because we will not exist!
- So, do X-risks require a new ethics framework?
- Person-affecting vs person-neutral ethics

Extreme Justifications: existential risk?



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 "Mitigating the risk of extinction from Al should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war." - <u>Center for Al safety</u>



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- For knowledge / science
- For a social release valve
- Just because we can
- For "backing up" our biosphere (mitigating existential risk)

X-risk: comets & asteroids

• K-T mass extinction, others?



Crater formed by asteroid 3.26 billion years ago Approximately 478 kilometers (297 miles) wide



Island of Hawaii 122 kilometers (76 miles) wide source: Hawaii economic data book



Chicxulub crater 65 million years ago At least 150 kilometers (93 miles) wide source: USGS

Beyond the robot uprising?

- Al could kill us all on purpose, or by accident...
- Perverse instantiation and 'paperclip maximizer'





- Fermi Paradox: If aliens exist, where is everybody?
 Why aren't aliens obvious, or even our ancestors?
- Earthlike planets estimate: ~40 billion in galaxy, with average Earthlike world ~2-3 billion years older.



Why Haven't We Found Aliens?

Rare Earth



Planets with complex life are extremely rare

Life As We Know It



ETs may be machines, not biological beings

Great Filter



ETs failed to overcome evolutionary hurdles

Long Road Ahead



We've got a lot more searching to do

Great Silence



Occam's Razor



We haven't found them b/c they don't exist Ethics + Emerging Sciences Group



- SETI: failure so far... so
- **Great Filter**: which variable is small, if N is near zero?
- Rare Earth hypothesis a biological variable
- **Prime Directive/ Zoo Hypothesis** advanced civilizations agree not to contact primitive civilizations.

Great Filter & Doom Soon?

- Existential worry: but what if *Filter is in our future*, because every civilization that reaches our level of technology soon goes extinct?!
- If L is small Doom Soon?



A solution to Doom Soon?

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- Reduce existential risks, by colonizing other planets?
- Crucial concern: do we have plenty of time to settle before extinction on Earth?
- Problem: our space robots; particularly Voyager 1 and 2, & hypothetical von Neumann probes



- Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA): "One should reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in one's reference class".
- So, for a random observation of a phenomenon: 95% probability it will continue for between 1/39 and 39 times its present age
- only 5% chance a random observation comes in the first or last
 2.5% of a phenomenon's lifetime
- *Voyager 1* first entered interstellar space in 2012
- So, in 2025, it's 95% probable that our time left as a civilization that sends interstellar robots
- is between L/39 (for L = 13 years, that's 122 more days) and 39L (507 more years)

Interstellar Doomsday Argument, cont'd

- von Neumann probes cinch problem?
- With feasible expansion speed of c/40, robotic saturation of the entire galaxy would take
- 4 million years, < 1/3,000th of the age of Milky Way.



- If we're not saturated by robotic probes from ancient aliens, implausible that it's because they need more time to get here.
- 'Oumuamua as alien lightsail probe? (Loeb)

X-risk and ethics

- Moral imperative: is reducing potential existential risks our highest moral priority?
- Consequentalism: expected utility = (Pr (Benefit) x Mag (Benefit)) (Pr (Harm) x Mag (Harm))
- any prob (no matter how low) x loss of nearinfinite value trumps any prob x (finite value)
- So, for standard consequentialism/ EA, we should prioritize lowering existential risk over any other good - reducing hunger, poverty, cancer, etc...

X-risk and ethics, cont'd

- Deontology *Extinction Principle*: "one always has a moral obligation never to allow the extinction of all creatures capable of moral obligation."
- Accordingly, it is an absolute duty to keep things capable of obeying absolute duties in existence.
- So, mitigating or minimizing existential risk is an absolute duty, which wins any conflict it has with another duty.
- If e.g., colonization of other planets thereby minimizes existential risk, then it is our highest duty.
- But: Virtue ethics may disagree ...

Solutions?

Conclusions: AI audit?



- One Solution for C-risk Responsible AI?
- Require regulation & *Al auditing*: count on best practice standards and procedures to emerge,
- and require implementation before deployment/ use
- Critics: possible *audit-washing* bad actors game loopholes and ambiguities in audit requirements
- to demonstrate compliance without actually providing meaningful reviews/ proof.
- AND: doesn't work for X-risk?

Conclusions: space backup?



- Is only solution to X-risk to develop & settle space?
- Burden of proof on opponents of space exploration? But....
 - Extend / worsen terrestrial conflicts
 - Opportunity costs
 - AI/Robots do it better?

Look before the next leap

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If risk of AI development means space settlement is our opportunity to **start over again/ provide a backup**,

Then let's give it the **forethought** it deserves, so that we don't simply replicate our current problems and **risks** elsewhere.

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Thank you!



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Survey and QR code info

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Here is the link to the survey: <u>https://bit.ly/AHC_AI_Summit_S25</u>

Here is the QR Code:

